As the Department of Telecommunications’ (DoT) SIM binding directive is set to take effect from January 1, 2027, MediaNama held a discussion on its technical feasibility, impact on users, the rationale behind it, and how scammers might adapt to SIM binding to continue committing fraud. During the discussion, several speakers highlighted the continuing ambiguity surrounding SIM binding, even though a year has passed since the directive was issued and just over a month and a half remains before its implementation.

For context, the Department of Telecommunications’ (DoT) directive to messaging platforms, issued in November 2025, requires each account on a platform to be bound to the KYC-verified SIM card in the user’s phone. The directive was sent to eight platforms: WhatsApp, Telegram, Signal, Arattai, Snapchat, ShareChat, JioChat and Josh. Meanwhile, in the absence of clarification from DoT, the broad definition of a Telecommunication Identifier User Entity (TIUE) could extend the directive’s scope in the future.

While WhatsApp, Telegram and Arattai have confirmed that they will implement the changes required for SIM binding, a source familiar with the implementation told MediaNama that DoT has since asked platforms to conduct periodic checks every 24 hours. The current compliance deadline is December 31, 2026.

Here is a list of questions that DoT needs to answer, followed by the speakers’ suggestions on how the government should approach SIM binding and fraud prevention in India.

1. Why was there no public consultation, and was an impact assessment conducted?

The department had roughly a year between issuing the original directions and extending the deadline. Meghna Bal questioned why DoT did not use this period to consult the people who would be affected by the rule and whether it had assessed the costs and inconvenience they might face.

“Why was a wider consultation not done? Was an impact assessment done by the DOT about the wider inconveniences and problems that it’s going to create in denial of access to communication to consumers or the disruptions for businesses, particularly small businesses, for whom this could be very existential?” — Meghna Bal

She also argued that there was a “fundamental disconnect between the means being chosen for the objective sought” through DoT’s SIM binding order. She said a public consultation would have allowed experts and members of the public to question the proposed measures and suggest alternatives.

2. Does DoT have jurisdiction over apps and devices?

DoT’s directive targets internet messaging services because they use mobile numbers to identify users. Prasanth Sugathan questioned whether this connection with telecom services was sufficient to bring an app under the Telecommunications Act, which falls under the Department of Telecommunications and the Ministry of Communications, rather than the Information Technology Act, which comes under the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY).

“If you look at DOT, there, I believe the only consideration is with respect to the telephone number. So otherwise, when you talk about app, it comes entirely within the realm of MEITY and the control and regulation of MEITY.” — Prasanth Sugathan

He also highlighted the friction between DoT, the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) and MeitY. TRAI has also previously attempted to regulate internet services and internet-based apps. Some examples include one, two, three, four and five.

Sugathan was responding to a question from Nikhil Pahwa, who referred to Anivar Aravind’s argument that the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) is the appropriate authority for issuing device guidelines and rules, not DoT. According to this argument, DoT does not have jurisdiction over smartphone devices.

This question is relevant because implementing the so-called continuous SIM binding mandated by DoT requires changes to operating systems (OS). Experts have questioned the technical feasibility of these changes. Apple has apparently made some changes to its iOS system, although the company has not officially confirmed this.

3. What is the threat model, and how widespread is the problem?

DoT has justified its SIM binding mandate on the grounds that cyber fraud and scams in India are carried out through communication apps such as WhatsApp and Telegram. Suman Kar, a cybersecurity researcher and chief executive of Banbreach, asked the department to publish its threat model before imposing requirements that could cause significant inconvenience to users.

“The first thing would be, give me a threat model. Give me a scale of the problem. What percentage of cyber crime are mediated through WhatsApp web that you think will be mitigated by this particular mandate?” — Suman Kar, Banbreach

Ritesh Bhatia, founding director of cyber incident response and investigations at V4Web Cybersecurity, also highlighted the lack of evidence supporting the mandate. He asked what proportion of cybercrime and financial losses could be attributed to WhatsApp or Telegram, and whether SIM binding would prevent such crimes. He estimated that SIM binding would reduce or affect “not more than 2% to 3%” of cybercrime.

4. What share of fraud takes place through WhatsApp Web?

DoT’s remote-session provisions target desktop sessions. Earlier, the department had mandated standard six-hour logouts from web sessions. However, in a response in the Rajya Sabha on April 2, 2026, Minister of State for Communications Pemmasani Chandra Sekhar stated that messaging platforms would have to log users out based on risk-based analysis.

However, DoT has not recommended a standard risk-based framework, nor is it clear what framework platforms will adopt. 

Addressing this issue, Suman Kar asked how much fraud actually takes place through WhatsApp Web.

“What percentage of cyber crime are mediated through WhatsApp web that you think will be mitigated by this particular mandate? It’ll never be 100%, right? And one more thing, I mean, no one actually expects that they’ll be able to curb crime by 100%, right? So what percent are we looking at?” — Suman Kar

5. Has anyone compared SIM binding with more effective alternatives?

Nikhil Pahwa, founder-editor of MediaNama and the moderator of the discussion, asked whether the department had compared SIM binding with other measures it could have adopted.

“Have they done any modeling in terms of the effectiveness and the efficacy of this mechanism as opposed to other mechanisms?” — Nikhil Pahwa, MediaNama

Participants also discussed several alternatives to SIM binding. These included:

  • Making two-step verification compulsory on WhatsApp instead of relying on continuous SIM checks to prevent scams involving SIM swaps.
  • Strengthening KYC measures at the telecom level.
  • Closing the mule-account pipeline through banks and the broader financial ecosystem.
  • Promoting targeted, risk-based coordination among telecom companies, banks and the Reserve Bank of India (RBI).
  • Conducting targeted investigations and crackdowns on SIM farms and scam centres.
  • Expanding public awareness and reducing the stigma faced by fraud victims.
  • Publishing a threat model and impact assessment, and conducting wider consultations before introducing any mechanism.

6. What does success look like, and who will evaluate it?

Suman Kar argued that the rule has no baseline metrics or clear criteria for measuring its effectiveness. Without these, the department that introduced the rule could simply declare it successful after implementation.

“If you’re going to design a solution, you’ll also need to place some baseline metrics. You’ll also need to define what success looks like, right? And the government hasn’t done that. You can’t just say we are successful after the fact [of implementation].” — Suman Kar

7. Why is the gap in telecom KYC not the primary target?

The rule requires platforms to bind accounts to KYC-verified SIM cards. Bal questioned why the government was not first addressing weaknesses in the verification process behind these SIM cards.

Participants agreed that fraudulent SIM cards were one of the key factors enabling cyber fraud and scams. She cited a study by the Indian School of Business, which found that 89% of alternate subscriber numbers are not Aadhaar-linked.

“If it’s known and it’s documented in studies that telco KYC processes have severe gaps in them and that is a major source of access to SIM cards for fraudsters, why is there no effort being made to ensure that is fixed first?” — Meghna Bal

8. Why is the DoT order not publicly available?

Apart from a press release issued by the Press Information Bureau, DoT did not make the official directive publicly available. However, a copy of the order is available at the end of this article.

Only eight communication platforms received the directive. Prasanth Sugathan, legal director at SFLC.in, questioned why the government was enforcing an order that was not publicly available to the people and businesses it affected. He also questioned whether DoT would extend the SIM binding mandate to other communication apps under the TIUE framework.

“We have this being mandated by a secret directive, which goes out to just eight companies. We don’t know what it is about. It is not published. It’s not out there in the gazette. And we don’t even know whether it applies to other companies who offer similar services.” — Prasanth Sugathan, SFLC.in

9. Why were only these eight companies selected, and why was Zoho’s Arattai included?

Aditi Agrawal, who runs the technology policy newsletter Tech Trace, questioned the rationale behind DoT sending SIM binding notices to the selected platforms, including Zoho’s Arattai.

“It was also sent to Arattai. I’m sorry, but why? Who was getting digitally arrested on Arattai? I mean, even if I were a fraudster, the cost of targeting someone on Arattai is going to be entirely too high and too useless. The payoff is not going to be worth it. So, arbitrariness just infects everything.” — Aditi Agrawal, Tech Trace

Responding to this concern, Nikhil Pahwa asked whether the government should explain how one messaging service differs from another.

In December 2025, MediaNama also questioned the arbitrary nature of the SIM binding order. The publication asked what clear criteria DoT was using to bring certain applications under the directive while excluding others. The department has not answered this question, even after a year.

During MediaNama’s earlier discussion on SIM binding, Pahwa asked why regulators should not focus only on platforms with the highest number of cybercrime cases. Prasanth Sugathan, legal director at SFLC.in, responded:

“Now, if you are just going to target one platform, I don’t think it will stand scrutiny. That would then be a case of discriminating against one platform while others [that] are offering similar kinds of services [are exempted].” — Prasanth Sugathan (December 2025)

10. What information will feed into the risk score, and who will have access to it?

Risk-based logouts could require platforms to build profiles of users, raising concerns about privacy, data retention and surveillance. These concerns are particularly relevant because Meta owns WhatsApp, Instagram, Facebook and Threads, among other services, and also develops AI models such as Muse.

Participants questioned what information would go into the risk assessment and whether platforms would keep the profiling data to themselves. Sugathan said metadata is personal data and that a risk score could give platforms a reason to collect more of it. He argued that this would go against the principle of data minimisation that data protection laws seek to promote.

“Because we’ve seen these problems with content control regulation—when you ask for AI-based systems to be used, and the kind of over-censorship that’s been happening with them. If something similar happens here, we don’t really know how it would play out. If you really want AI and risk-based quantification using AI tools, we don’t know how that would play out either. So what exactly do you mean by that? … If Meta is collecting the data, we also need to understand that the government gets access to it. … But we all talk about data minimization—now we’re talking about maximizing the data being collected.” — Prasanth Sugathan

Here is the brief list of wish list of the speakers and participants:

1. Hold public consultations across the ministries responsible for different parts of the problem: Almost everyone in the discussion agreed that DoT should have conducted a public consultation before introducing the SIM binding mandate.

Meghna Bal specifically suggested restarting the process with separate consultations involving DoT on telecom issues, MeitY on platform-related issues, and the Reserve Bank of India on banking and mule accounts.

“”If they’re serious about solving this [fraud and scam problem], start a consultation and let this consultation happen in DOT and separately happen in MEITY because the jurisdictions are different… DOT should try to solve the issues with telcos, which have been highlighted again and again. MEITY should try to see how it can cooperate with app service providers if they have a role to play here. And simultaneously, RBI as well can work on the mule account side since that seemed to be something that everyone kind of raised.” — Meghna Bal

2. Define what risk-based analysis means and what factors it considers: Prasanth Sugathan called for greater transparency in the proposed risk-based analysis. He wanted DoT to explain how platforms would assess risks and what factors they would consider when deciding whether to log users out.

3. Scrap the rule and address mule accounts instead: Ritesh Bhatia, founding director of cyber incident response and investigations at V4Web Cybersecurity, wanted the government to withdraw the rule and focus on closing the financial channels used by scammers.

“If you ask me, I would want this entire thing to be scrapped,” he said. “Just imagine if there are no mule accounts only or the number of mule accounts are kind of reduced and all that. You don’t need to do all these kinds of things.”

4. Publish the threat model before implementing the mechanism: Suman Kar called on the government to return to the basics and clearly define the problem it wants to solve, its scale, how it will measure the problem and what baseline it will use to evaluate the solution.

The threat model should include:

  • The scale of the problem.
  • The share of cybercrime that takes place through WhatsApp and WhatsApp Web and the proportion that SIM binding is expected to prevent.
  • Baseline metrics and clearly defined success criteria.
  • Whether SIM binding is intended as a permanent requirement or a temporary measure linked to a particular crime threshold.

Without answering these questions, he argued, the government cannot claim that SIM binding has succeeded after implementation. The public also cannot assess whether the inconvenience caused by the mandate is proportionate or justified.

5. Hold the state and law enforcement agencies accountable: Aditi Agrawal called for greater accountability from law enforcement agencies. “The biggest one for me would be that the state needs to be far more responsible, which means also holding law enforcement agencies accountable,” she said.

6. Run an awareness campaign targeting people vulnerable to fraud.
Gunjan Yogendra, an independent policy analyst and participant in the discussion, questioned what the government was doing to help people who may not be able to identify online fraud. She suggested that a public-private partnership could help address this problem.

“Given there are different demographics in certain states, people who are old aged, children who are using social media, adults who are not so conversant with the technology, what is being done… there could be a public-private partnership in terms of, you know, starting a campaign.” — Gunjan Yogendra

You can watch the full discussion on YouTube:

Note: This discussion is being organised with support from Esya Centre.

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